Afterthoughts on the Abolition of Work

This is Chapter 9 of Instead of Work (Berkeley, CA: LBC Books, 2015), which was written in 2015 and now is slightly revised. The references in brackets, such as [IV], refer to other chapters of the book.

The dawn of civilization was the dawn of work. In southern Mesopotamia (Iraq), almost 6,000 years ago, “elites came to view and use fully encumbered laborers in the same exploitative way that human societies, over the immediately preceding millennia, had viewed and used the labor of domesticated animals. This represents a new paradigm of social relations in human societies.”1) It’s time for a new paradigm. Buddy, can youse paradigm?2)

I’ve been writing about (and against) work, on and off, for 30 years. Somewhat to my dismay, the abolition of work is still the idea that I am most often associated with. My original essay [I] has been reprinted many times, and translated into at least 15 languages, including Esperanto. It is even briefly excerpted in a Canadian textbook on industrial relations!3) That’s more attention than I’ve received in most of the anarchist press. Even the Wall Street Journal published a lobotomized version of “No Future for the Workplace” [IV].4)

I wish that my ideas about social order and dispute resolution under anarchy received more attention.5) I wish that my ideas about a post-left anarchism, which are widely shared, received more attention.6) I wish that my critiques of anarchist celebrities who aren’t anarchists at all, such as Murray Bookchin and Noam Chomsky (others have noticed this too), received more attention.7) Most of what little now remains of the anarchist periodical press8) doesn’t publish me, nor does it review my books or refer to my writings. Their loss as much as mine. A lot of anarchists need some smartening up.9) If anarchism is a room, I am the elephant in that room.

However, I have always insisted that my critique of work, like my critique of democracy,10) is not addressed only to anarchists. It would be pretty useless if it were. Work is more important than anything the anarchists are complaining about, except – possibly – the state. But they rarely complain about the state any more. It is almost impossible to exaggerate the importance of work in the lives of everybody, although, I may have done so, when I wrote [I]: “Work is the source of nearly all the misery in the world.” And yet, in the 19th century, Paul Lafargue – son in law of Karl Marx! – could write this: “All individual and social misery is born of the passion for work.”11) My anti-work writings are addressed to everybody, but especially to everybody who works, or who wants to work, or who doesn’t want to work. That includes just about everybody. I would like more people to consider my critique of work – people who are not anarchists, Marxists, liberals, or any other kind of ideologue.

I have never lost interest in the subject of work. The essays collected in this book, in more or less chronological order, demonstrate my ongoing interest. Whether they also demonstrate any improvement in my critique of work, is for the reader to decide. Rereading them has given me a lot to think about. It has also encouraged me to do a lot of other reading and some rereading. Frankly, I think that, in general, I got it right the first time. I stand by every idea about work in “The Abolition of Work” and in my subsequent writings. Usually, I prudently refrained from prophecy. But there are some points which require clarification, such as the meaning of “leisure.”

I have received a little ridicule, but very little serious criticism. The major critiques, one from the right and one from the left, are debunked here [III & VIII]. Hopefully this book will provoke a fresh round of rash criticism for me to annihilate. I just love to do that.

This is from Bertrand Russell: “First of all, what is work? Work is of two kinds: first, altering the position of matter at or near the earth’s surface relatively to other matter; second, telling other people to do so.” He adds: “The first kind is unpleasant and ill-paid; the second is pleasant and highly paid.”12) Although one academic mistook this for a definition of work, it is actually just a witty way of criticizing work.

Debating definitions is always boring, and “’Work’ is harder to define than you might think.”13) My original definitions of work (a short version and a long version) [I] were intended only to cover what I consider work and what most people consider to be work. Nothing fancy. Work includes servile labor – chattel slavery, serfdom, indentured servitude, and peonage – although these forms of labor are absent in modern industrial and so-called post-industrial societies. It includes work for wages or a salary. It includes much, maybe nearly all self-employment and contract work – contract work, especially, being nowadays often disguised wage-labor. Work includes housework, paid or unpaid. The fact that my critique is equally applicable to slavery, wage-labor and housework should embarrass believers in work.

Whether work includes schooling, is an important issue which I will continue to neglect, aside from pointing out again [I] that much schooling is work-related. It consists (sometimes) of vocational training or, minimally, training in pre-work practices such as showing up on time, subjection to the clock, sitting still for almost an hour at a time, and acquiring minimal reading and arithmetic skills. After all, “employers’ most common and general rules have to do with regular attendance and being on time.”14) Apparently schooling doesn’t do even that very much anymore. School is mainly daycare and preventive detention.

In primitive societies and in many utopias, just as work can hardly be distinguished from play, the education of children can hardly be distinguished from play. Children observe work, imitate work, and gradually begin to work. Ivan Illich identified students’ cramming for finals as “shadow work,” because it is unpaid and rarely done for the fun of it.15) In the feminist utopia Herland, “it was all education but no schooling.” Education there consists of playing games.16) In Restif de la Bretonne’s 18th century utopia, “work is almost a game and games are forms of education.”17) The advocates of learning-by-doing, such as John Dewey and Maria Montessori, are correct as far as they go. But they fall short of the utopians for whom education was not just a preparation for life, it is integrated into life. This idea is at least as old as Thomas More’s Utopia.18) Few schools practice what Dewey, Montessori and A.S. Neill preached.

Whether or not my definitions completely succeed in covering all my enumerated types of labor, my objective is to identify, as work, all the activities to which my critique of work applies. I have never claimed that every one of my criticisms of work applies to every work situation. For instance, not all work is unhealthy or monotonous, and not every worker works long hours. But whether I am talking about lack of autonomy (being bossed and supervised), lack of privacy (cubicles, surveillance and snitches), lack of creativity, boring and repetitious work, lack of variety in work, unsafe work, painful work, underpaid work, unpaid work, or just too much God damn work, most of these criticisms are more or less applicable to everything I call work. So, no quibbling, please. Work is too important to be trifled with. Call it what you please, for your own purposes, but, if you discuss my ideas, you have to use the words the way I do.

I’ve also used words such as leisure and play. The abolition of work certainly implicates leisure and play. I don’t think that I’ve misused these words, but, I haven’t always used them precisely. From my recent reading, I know that nobody is using these words precisely or consistently. Thus I am going to discuss more explicitly what I mean by leisure and play, insofar as I contrast them with work. I am still inclined to largely ignore certain degradations of leisure and play such as recreation19) and sport. I think they lead us away from the central question, which is whether the satisfactions of recreation and sport (satisfactions which are taken for granted) are only after-work diversions, or whether there is something about them which might be incorporated into work itself. If that could be done, the result might not be work at all.

Then there is free time, which is not necessarily idle time. You might or might not be doing something during your free time. One writer refers to “subsistence activities,” which include certain uncompensated but necessary activities – such as “the minimums of sleeping, eating, and related activities like cooking and shopping.”20) But while “No one should ever work” [I] might, after some explaining, make some sense to some people, “No one should ever poop” does not. One might identify these activities as work, as has been done,21) but I would distinguish biological functions from cooking, shopping, and commuting, which are shadow work. Cooking and eating are activities which have great ludic potential: but cooking can be a job and eating can be just refueling. Sex can be done for pleasure or, as the Catholic Church advocates, for making Catholic babies. For Charles Fourier, whose meals were usually the poor fare of a traveling salesman, “Harmony” was a society where people enjoyed five meals a day in good company.22) In Thomas More’s Utopia and many others, including William Morris’ News from Nowhere, meals are core social occasions.23) I can relate to that. But in a work-dominated society, “any time after work is ‘free,’ but even that time, if work must be clocked, is work-bound.”24)

My critics hitherto have been simple-minded, or pretended to be. First I define work and play as antitheses: then (they wail) I call for their synthesis! A Hegelian dialectician would take that in stride, but, I don’t require dialectical acrobatics to be understood. If I did, I wouldn’t understand myself either. In terms of Scholastic logic, work and play are contraries but not contradictories. They are different but not necessarily opposed, unless by definitional fiat. Right from the start I’ve identified several predecessors – especially Charles Fourier and William Morris – who were saying substantially what I am saying, but in their own words. To put it another way, I am saying substantially what they were saying, but in my own words. Anything worth saying should be sayable, and is best said, in multiple ways. Like the Situationists, my goal is simply “replacing work with a new type of free activity; …”25) We can worry about what to call it, after we live it.

Since 1985, I have come across more and more versions of the idea which is central to my thesis: the possibility of the abolition of work by replacing it with generalized productive play. I’m not going to amass the citations here. But, as an illustration, here is something from an unexpected source: the Pragmatist philosopher and educator, John Dewey. He was a pillar of the intellectual Establishment, and a moderate socialist – although he didn’t go out of his way to say so. He is so respectable that one or two of his books are still in the curriculum for education majors, including a book (originally published in 1916) which I now quote: “Work is psychologically simply an activity which consciously includes regard for consequences as part of itself; it becomes constrained labor when the consequences are outside of the activity, as an end to which activity is merely a means. Work which remains permeated with the play attitude is art.”26)

I continue to reject definitions of play, such as those of Johan Huizinga and Adriano Tilgher,27) which exclude by fiat the possibility of productive play. The dictionary definitions are much broader.28) Tilgher went so far as to say: “There is something else in play than action for the mere pleasure of action. Play – if it is real play – always has something of triviality about it. Play is not serious, there can be no passion about it.”29) Huizinga at least understood that play can be serious.30) Only someone who has never seen children at play could say that play is never serious [I]. Only someone who has never played, or who has forgotten what play is like, could say that. Plenty of work has “no passion about it.” There can be, obviously, productive play – there are weekend hunters, fishers, gardeners, and successful poker players. I am not going to let definitions get in the way of what I say, especially definitions which are wrong.

I have previously quoted [I] the Romantic poet Friedrich Schiller: “The animal works when deprivation is the mainstream of its activity, and it plays when the fullness of its strength is its mainstream, when superabundant life is its own stimulus to activity.”31) For Schiller, man has a twofold nature: a “pure intellect” (Reason) in the world of the mind, and an “empirical intellect” (Nature) in the world of sense experience.32) They are reconciled, and man fully becomes all that he is, in play: “So the play impulse, in which both combine to function, will compel the mind at once morally and physically; it will therefore, since it annuls all mere chance, annul all compulsion too, and set man free both physically and morally.”33) He called for “replacing work with pleasure, exertion with relaxation, activity with passivity.” He thought that, through the intermediation of beauty, play is transformed into seriousness, and seriousness is transformed into play.”34) Schiller’s language is a bit flowery for modern tastes, and sometimes obscure, but at least one of his points is well-taken. It has practical implications. As Charles Fourier wrote: “Our pleasures have no connection with industry, and are consequently unproductive; whereas in the combined order they will be connected with productive industry, which will itself be a succession of pleasures, when rendered attractive.”35) The synthesis of work (production of useful output) and play (activity for its own sake) is what I call the abolition of work [III].

Here is a quick summary of the distinctions. What work and play have in common is that they are activities, whereas leisure (my next topic) is a period of time. What play and leisure have in common is that they are voluntary, whereas work is not. Of these three, work is by definition productive; play is not necessarily productive or unproductive; and leisure is by definition unproductive, because it is not an activity. “Leisure” is short for leisure time. Or, leisure time may be used in productive or unproductive activities, or merely allowed to pass (this is idleness36)). To put it another way: “At some point, less work plus better work ends up as activity it no longer makes sense to call work at all, although it furnishes the means of life.”37)

It was my good fortune that in 1985 I was largely ignorant of the immense academic literature on work, play and leisure. Had I examined very many of those trees, I might never have noticed the forest.

Leisure is a period of time in which one does not work, although not all time in which one does not work is leisure. The Greek and Latin words for “work” are negative terms, “non-leisure.”38) Thus the words work and leisure are antonyms, whereas the words work and play are not. As such, leisure is a “residual” category — it is “free time,” in the sense of being some of the time that remains when working time is subtracted. But people are not at leisure when they are sleeping or commuting.39) A more useful definition would exclude biological functions and also activities which are immediately undertaken in the furtherance of work, such as commuting or the coffee break – if there is still such a thing as a coffee break.

Work is something you have to do, but not everything you have to do is work. The original meaning of leisure was time apart from work: “The term leisure comes from the Latin licere, meaning ‘to be permitted,’ and is defined in the modern dictionary as ‘freedom from occupation, employment, or engagement.”40) That was the classical understanding. Aristotle (he tells us) “believed that happiness depends on leisure, because we occupy ourselves so that we have leisure …”41) Mechanics, slaves, freed slaves, foreigners, women and children are not to be admitted to citizenship: “The necessary people are either slaves who minister to the wants of individuals, or mechanics and labourers who are the servants of the community … for no man can practice excellence who is living the life of a mechanic or labourer.”42)

For Aristotle and his class, leisure was not, as we think of it, time after work. There was no such time for them, because they didn’t work. For Aristotle, everything in the universe had a purpose or an innate tendency: a goal. The purpose of leisure was, broadly speaking, happiness: the happiness of the cultivated few. It was time to be devoted to civic duties but, above all, to philosophy and contemplation. This must have had a particular appeal for Aristotle because, unlike Plato, he was not an Athenian citizen. He had no civic duties.

There is still a current of traditional thought which carries on the idea that leisure has a purpose: a higher purpose than work, certainly,43) and something higher than television, gaming, texting and spectator sports. Leisure is said to be the basis of culture. But the prevalent understanding is still what I wrote in 1985 [I]: “Leisure is nonwork for the sake of work.” It’s also true that some leisure-time behavior “may be, in part, a response to social pressure or powerful inner drives, and may not therefore be a preferred form of behavior.”44) (Among other reasons.) But that does not help to define leisure, as the same thing might be said of work, play, and almost any social activity. It is also idle to complain: “To look upon leisure only as a respite from work is never to discover its full potential.”45) This is a tacit admission that, in fact, leisure is only a respite from work. Leisure’s full potential is realized only when leisure is realized and suppressed.

As we shall see, working hours have increased – and therefore leisure time has decreased – for over 60 years in the United States. Leisure in the modern sense has to be, first, rest – a respite from work – otherwise the worker is in no condition to do much of anything. There may be no time left over for anything else except passive consuming. After a certain point – which most workers have surely reached – according to Max Weber, “one does not work in order to live, but one lives for the sake of one’s work.”46)

It is difficult to believe, but, for many years, intellectuals, such as academics and clergymen, as well as politicians and businessmen, considered leisure (not their own, of course) to be a social problem. Working hours did fall from 1900 to 1920, and more slowly in the 1920’s, and at a faster rate in the 1930’s, slipping below 35 hours a week.47) Hence books from prestigious publishers with titles like The Problem of Leisure and The Threat of Leisure.48) Incredibly, as late as 1960 or so, “aside from the thoughts of a few stray persons, all see the ‘leisure problem’ narrowly, as too much, badly spent time.”49) As late as 1963, a book could be published with the absurd title The Challenge of Leisure. There exists an excellent recent


Guillermo Algaze, Ancient Mesopotamia and the Dawn of Civilization: The Evolution of an Urban Landscape (Chicago, IL & London: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 128. “Scribal summaries dealing with the composition of groups of foreign and native born captives used as laborers describe them with age and sex categories identical to those used to describe state-owned herd animals, including various types of cattle and pigs [citations omitted].” Ibid., 129.
Bob Black, “Let Us Prey!The Abolition of Work and Other Essays (Port Townsend, WA: n.d. [1986]), 73.
John Godard, Industrial Relations: The Economy and Society (Toronto, Canada: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1994), 425.
Bob Black, “All Play and No Work,” Wall Street Journal Reports, June 4, 1990, R17. The original version, “No Future for the Workplace,” is in Bob Black, Friendly Fire (Brooklyn, NY: Autonomedia, 1992), 13-18.
Bob Black, “Justice: Primitive and Modern;” Bob Black, “An Anarchist Response to ’The Anarchist Response to Crime,’” Defacing the Currency: Selected Writings, 1992-2012 (Berkeley, CA: Little Black Cart, 2013), 193-216. The first essay appears, in Russian translation, in my second Russian book, Anarchy and Democracy, published by Hylaea.
Bob Black, “Notes on ‘Post-Left’ Anarchism;” see also Wolfi Landstreicher, “From Politics to Life: Ridding Anarchy of the Leftist Millstone,” Anarchy: A Journal Armed No. 54 (20(2) (Winter 2002-2003): 47-51.
Black, “Chomsky on the Nod,” Defacing the Currency, 61-172; Bob Black, Anarchy after Leftism (Columbia, MO: C.A.L. Press, 1997); Bob Black, Nightmares of Reason (2005- ). On Chomsky, see also “Noam Chomsky’s Anarchism,” Anarchism and Anarchists: Essays by George Woodcock (Kingston, Ontario, Canada: Quarry Press, 1992), 224-228; John Zerzan, “Who Is Chomsky?” in Running on Emptiness: The Pathology of Civilization (Los Angeles, CA: Feral House, 2002), 140-143.
Jason McQuinn, “What Happened to the Anarchist Press?” Modern Slavery No. 2 (Fall-Winter 2012/2013), 6-7.
“That the range of anarchists includes the clowns from protest alley, micrometer-toting specialists of oppression-identification, and Marxists who wear black flags isn’t a condemnation of anarchist ideas but is a significant reason for pause.” [Aragorn!], Boom: Introductory Writings on Nihilism ([Berkeley, CA]: n.p., 2013), 93.
Black, “Debunking Democracy,” Defacing the Currency, 3-33.
Paul Lafargue, The Right to Be Lazy, trans. Len Bracken (Ardmore, PA: Fifth Season Press, 1999), 5. He also stated: “In capitalist societies, work is the cause of all intellectual degeneracy and all organic deformities.” Ibid., 3.
Bertrand Russell, “In Praise of Idleness,” In Praise of Idleness and Other Essays (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1935), 14-15.
Keith Thomas, “Introduction,” The Oxford Book of Work, ed. Keith Thomas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), xiii.
Ivan Illich, ”Shadow Work,” Shadow Work (Boston, MA & London: Marion Boyars, 1981), 100.
Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Herland (New York: Pantheon Books, 1979), 106. “ … ‘child’s play’ … may in fact represent an optimum setting for children’s learning.” Edward C. Devereux, “Backyard versus Little League Baseball: Some Observations of the Impoverishment of Children’s Games in America,” in Contemporary Issues in Sociology of Sport, ed. Andrew Yiannakis (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics Publishers, 2001), 66.
Nicolas Edme Restif de la Bretonne, “The Pursuit of Happiness Through Rules and Regulations,” in //French Utopias: An Anthology of Ideal Societies//, ed. Frank E. Manuel & Fritzie P. Manuel (New York: The Free Press & London: Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1966), 171.
Thomas More, Utopia: A Revised Translation, Backgrounds, Criticism, trans. & ed. Robert M. Adams ((2d ed.; New York & London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992), 36 (originally 1516). A modern argument is in Paul & Percival Goodman, Communitas: Means of Livelihood and Ways of Life (2d ed.; New York: Vintage Books, 1960), 157 (originally 1947).
Richard Neville, Play Power: Exploring the International Underground (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), 274: Play has been replaced by “recreation,” the function of which is to “re-create” the worker for work: to repair him.
Sebastian de Grazia, Of Time, Work, and Leisure (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1962), 91.
Stanley Parker, Leisure and Work (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 4.
The Utopian Vision of Charles Fourier, trans. & ed. Jonathan Beecher & Richard Bienvenu (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1971), 251. “Fourier loved, but could seldom afford, his country’s best wines.” Jonathan Beecher & Richard Bienvenu, “Introduction,” in ibid., 26. No doubt Fourier occasionally ate better food than he usually got in cheap cafes, if only because he was the brother in law of the famous gourmand Jean Anthelm Brillat-Savarin, author of The Physiology of Taste, trans. M.F.K. Fisher (San Francisco, CA: North Point Press, 1986). Brillat-Savarin called for “gastronomy”; Fourier called for “gastrosophy.” Brillat-Savarin is best known for his maxim, “you are what you eat.” Who suspected, until now, that there is a remote link between utopian socialism and “Iron Chef”?
Marie Louise Berneri, Journey through Utopia (London: Freedom Press, 1982), 77-78, 115 (originally 1950).
De Grazia, Of Time, Work, and Leisure, 326.
“Ideologies, Classes, and the Domination of Nature,” Situationist International Anthology, ed. & trans. Ken Knabb (rev., exp. ed.; Berkeley, CA: Bureau of Public Secrets, 2006), 32 [from I.S. #2 (1962)].
John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: Macmillan, 1969), 241-42 (originally 1916), quoted in Richard Sennett, The Craftsman (New Haven, CT & London: Yale University Press, 2008), 287-88.
Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1955), 13; Adriano Tilgher, Homo Faber: Work Through the Ages, trans. Dorothy Canfield Fisher (Chicago, IL: Gateway Books, 1965), 194. B.F. Skinner defined play as “serious behavior with non-serious consequences.” B.F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York, Bantom Books, 1972), 170. Skinner at least understood that people who play, take play seriously: “Said most generally, play draws its energies from real life. Something must be there to be played with.” Thomas S. Hendricks, Play Reconsidered: Sociological Perspectives on Human Expression (Urbana & Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2006), 131.
E.g., The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 2: 2244-2245. “The English word ‘work’ has so wide and rich a range and so varied a past that a mere catalogue of its senses would be several pages long.” De Grazia, Of Time, Work, and Leisure, 40. Huizinga was a medievalist and, like most historians, he liked the period he studied. That imparted “aristocratic, idealist sensibilities,” nonetheless, there is “no reason to separate so strictly the material incentives and consequences of play from the symbolic ones.” Hendricks, Play Reconsidered, 216, 217.
Tilgher, Homo Faber, 194. Rather, Professor Giuseppe Rensi, whom he quotes (at 191), is surely right to say (with much redundancy) that play is engaged in “for itself because of the pleasure or interest which it inspires in us intrinsically considered in itself, as an end in itself, with no ulterior views.”
Huizinga, Homo Ludens, 5-6. In fact, he discerned the play element in activities which, by his definition, could not include it: art, war, law, even business. “It seems not so much that civilization lives through play, but rather that play lives despite civilization. Huizinga himself says that as culture develops and civilization becomes more complex, the element of play recedes.” Alex Trotter, review of Homo Ludens, Anarchy: A Journal of Desire Armed No. 46 (16)(2) (Fall-Winter 1998-1999), 12, 15.
Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, in a Series of Letters, trans. Reginald Snell (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954), 133.
Ibid., 43-45, 70 n. 1. Obviously Schiller was heavily influenced by Kant.
Ibid., 74; see also Alasdair Clayre, Work and Play: Ideas and Experience of Work and Leisure (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), ch. 2, esp. at 20-21. “The true end of Man,” according to Wilhelm von Humboldt, “is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole.” Its two conditions are freedom and “a variety of conditions.” The Limits of State Action, ed. J.W. Burrow (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1993), 10. This part of the book was published – by Schiller – in New Thalia (1792). The book itself was published posthumously.
Friedrich Schiller, “Letters to Prince Frederick Christian von Hardenburg,” in On the Aesthetic Education of Man, trans. Keith Tribe (n.p.: Penguin Classics, 2016), 152. Herbert Marcuse also called for a “new rationality of gratification in which reason and instinct can unite.” Eros and Civilization (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1964), 224.
Fourier, Harmonian Man, 181.
In William Morris’s utopia, idleness is considered a medical condition. News from Nowhere or An Epoch of Rest (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), 33.
Black, Nightmares of Reason, 43.
Josef Pieper, Leisure, The Basis of Culture, trans. Gerald Malsbary (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 1998), 5.
Parker, Leisure and Work, 3-4; Charles K. Brightbill, The Challenge of Leisure (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963), 4.
Brightbill, Challenge of Leisure, 3.
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. J.H.K. Thomson, rev. Hugh Tredennick (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 271. He also thought that contemplation was the best use of leisure.
“Politics,” The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 2: 2028.
De Grazia, Of Time, Work, and Leisure, 5-6; e.g., Pieper, Leisure, chs. 1-5 (Pieper was a Catholic theologian).
Noel Pitts & Sylvia Fleis Fava, Urban Society (New York: Crowell, 1963), 411.
Parker, Leisure and Work, 6.
Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958), 264 n. 24, quoted in Pieper, Leisure, 4.
Benjamin Kline Hunnicut, Work Without End: Abandoning Shorter Hours for the Right to Work (Philadelphia, PA: Pennsylvania University Press, 1988), 1.
Henry W. Durant, The Problem of Leisure (London: Routledge, 1938); George Barton Cutten, The Threat of Leisure (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1926). Leisure was not a problem in 1938!
De Grazia, Of Time, Work, and Leisure, 276.